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Doing Law Beyond the State 
Methodological Questions in International and Transnational Legal Theory 
Patrick Capps1 and Richard Collins2 
 
Over the last two decades the landscape of legal theory has changed dramatically. Well-
established assumptions regarding the nature of law have been cast into doubt by a 
notable expansion in the normative scope and regulative reach of forms of law beyond 
the state. This has resulted in two distinct, but related, disciplinary shifts. First, analytical 
legal theory has begun to question seriously its parochial focus, turning its gaze towards 
global or international legal phenomena. Second, international and European lawyers are 
beginning to revisit conceptual questions about the nature of their respective fields as 
conventional disciplinary certainties vanish from view.3 Whilst these shifts have 
prompted disciplinary self-reflection, a cross-disciplinary dialogue has not yet been well-
established. Where legal philosophers have begun to wonder how EU, international and 
transnational legal phenomena impact on the concept of law, these enquiries are still very 
much embryonic and often disconnected from the more practical concerns of 
international and EU lawyers. At the same time, it is clear that international and EU 
lawyers reflect more on the theory of their discipline than they used to, but there have 
been relatively few cross-disciplinary conversations about the nature of law, or ‘legality’ 
in general.  
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It is against this background that this special edition of Transnational Legal Theory 
took shape. The papers in this issue arose out of a workshop at the University of Bristol 
in January 2014, which was organised by the editors of this special edition. The 
workshop included contributions by Cormac Mac Amhlaigh (Edinburgh), Jean 
d’Aspremont (Manchester/Amsterdam), Julie Dickson (Oxford), Jörg Kammerhofer 
(Freiburg), Michael Giudice (York, Canada), Gleider Hernandez (Durham), Jacob v. H. 
Holtermann (Copenhagen), Anne van Mulligen (Amsterdam), Henrik Palmer Olsen 
(Copenhagen), Stuart Toddington (Huddersfield), Ingo Venzke (Amsterdam), Wouter 
Werner (VU Amsterdam) and Michael Wilkinson (LSE). This workshop, which was 
funded by the universities of Bristol and Sheffield, arose from a broader project on 
research methodologies in EU and international law that originated at the University of 
Sheffield in 2013.  
The participants at the workshop were asked to reflect upon the following three 
questions: 
  
1. How far is it possible to make descriptive claims about the nature of international 
or transnational law without taking an evaluative position on the function or 
purpose of each legal order and law more generally?  
 
2. How do (or should) our perceptions of the purpose or nature of legal orders 
become reflected in legal practice, particularly in international and transnational 
courts and dispute settlement bodies (eg in textual interpretation or legal opinion)? 
 
3. What do the methodological challenges revealed by doing international and 
transnational legal research demonstrate about the methodology of legal theory 
more broadly? 
 
Each of the papers selected for inclusion in this special edition provide answers to 
one or more of these questions in the course of developing their own distinctive 
contribution. For instance, the papers by Giudice, Dickson and Collins consider the 
adequacy of a descriptive-explanatory model based upon the judgments of significance 
and importance made by officials and participants in international and transnational legal 
practice. Furthermore, the papers by van Mulligen and Olsen address ways in which 
international and transnational legal reasoning and practice are influenced by distinctive 
tensions between instrumental reasoning (pursuing political and moral ends) and the 
formal requirements of legality and the rule of law. Finally, and most significantly, all the 
papers explain, in very different ways, how focusing on the specificities of international 
and transnational legal orders can significantly enhance the explanatory capability of 
legal theory, just as pertinent methodological debates in jurisprudence can help contribute 
to a better understanding of what it is to ‘do’ international and transnational legal 
research. 
The opening paper by Julie Dickson explores the possibilities that her approach to 
method in legal philosophy offers for an explanation of transnational legal phenomena. 
Her methodology, which she calls ‘Indirectly Evaluative Legal Philosophy’, owes a debt 
to that of HLA Hart and Joseph Raz in the sense that it attempts to articulate the 
distinctive character of legal phenomena from the point of view of participants within a 
legal order. In the course of the discussion, she sets out certain ‘dangers’ to be avoided 
and ‘desiderata’ to be attained if—to quote Dickson herself—‘our theories of law are to be 
sufficiently attuned to, and appropriately illuminating regarding, the domain of 
transnational law’.4 Specifically, Dickson warns against two all-too-easy assumptions: 
that the growing scope and scale of transnational legal phenomena represent an entirely 
new challenge to legal theory, and that analytical legal philosophy itself has remained 
largely ignorant or non-cognizant of non-state forms of law. However, she claims that 
any method that seeks to provide an adequate theoretical account of forms of law outside 
of the state context must articulate the importance of law in the distinct and diverse 
contexts it emerges. Dickson claims that her method can achieve this aim, whilst also 
ensuring that legal philosophers avoid the temptation to prematurely venerate or endorse 
law’s value in moral terms—a temptation that she believes it is vital to resist.  
In his paper, Michael Giudice uses a specific conceptual problem at the heart of EU 
law—conflicting views as to its ultimate source of validity—in order to critique the 
adequacy of the method endorsed by many of those in the positivist tradition (such as Raz 
and, indeed, Dickson). This tradition seeks to elucidate a concept of law that is faithful to 
the conceptual distinctions drawn by those who administer, or who are subject to, law, 
and that is sometimes called ‘conceptual analysis’. In doing so, Giudice considers, but 
ultimately rejects, the philosophical soundness of the legal pluralist conclusion that the 
ultimate criterion of validity in EU law is simply relative to the viewpoint of participants 
within each particular legal system. His main conclusion is that conceptual analysis can 
only ever form the starting point of a theoretical explanation of the nature of law, which 
thereafter requires what he terms ‘constructive conceptual explanation’. More precisely, 
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Giudice argues that the legal theorist cannot shirk his or her responsibility to evaluate and 
decide upon the respective merits of each of these competing and incommensurable 
validity claims. 
The contribution by Richard Collins pushes this reasoning even further, arguing that 
a purely descriptive, value-neutral jurisprudence is impossible. His conclusion is 
propelled by an analysis of one of the most under-theorised yet critically significant 
explanatory elements of legal conceptual analysis: the legal official. Specifically, the idea 
that officials accept an ultimate rule of recognition within each particular legal system is 
seen as crucial to the concept of law. Collins argues that in the absence of a clear 
explanation and justification as to why the official viewpoint is to be prioritised, the 
concept of officialdom acts merely as a ‘boot-strapping’ device, allowing legal 
philosophers to presuppose, rather than justify, the importance of a constitutional 
hierarchy to the coherence of a legal system. In the absence of such a hierarchy at the 
international level, public international law appears deficient as a legal system. However, 
he claims that this conclusion can only follow if legal theorists are explicit about why 
such a hierarchy is important and, by implication, what purpose it serves. Given that there 
may well be strong normative reasons for retaining the decentralised, non-hierarchical 
character of international law, Collins instead concludes that our assumptions about law’s 
functional purpose must be either scaled back, or else remain focused upon, and 
contextualised to, particular legal orders.  
Picking up on the analytical and normative methods discussed in earlier papers, Anne 
van Mulligen seeks to both describe and reconstruct the process of ‘deformalisation’ of 
the international legal order. As he explains, deformalisation describes a set of inter-
related and complex claims, but to locate this term at its most general level, it describes 
the displacement of formal modes of law ascertainment and reasoning by a more 
technocratic, managerialist approach, which emphasises law’s ability to achieve 
functional solutions. Despite offering a seemingly depoliticised view of law as an 
instrument for the achievement of certain objectives, van Mulligen shows how this 
deformalisation undermines certain republican values underpinning formal legality. He 
seeks to cut through the often complex claims made in relation to deformalisation by 
distilling its central element, which is the displacement of content-independent techniques 
of legal reasoning with content-dependent techniques. He concludes his argument with 
the claim that deformalisation is not in itself problematic, as many prominent 
international legal scholars have held, except in so far as it threatens to destabilise a 
normatively appropriate balance between these two techniques of legal reasoning. 
Although not deploying the same terminology as van Mulligen, a very similar 
dynamic between formal legal reasoning, and more instrumental modes of reasoning (that 
attempt to advance moral or political objectives), underpins the discussion of 
international courts in the paper by Henrik Palmer Olsen. Olsen’s starting point is the 
‘autonomisation’ of international courts. Autonomisation refers to the process by which 
international courts form and sustain an autonomous interpretation of what the law is 
within their jurisdiction. Olsen suggests that international courts have to be much more 
nuanced and strategic when developing law that is always sensitive to the political 
context in which they adjudicate. ‘Legal Diplomacy’ describes what courts are doing 
when attending to this sensitivity. And sensitivity to this issue, Olsen argues, is critical to 
an adequate explanation of the evolution of international courts.  
Individually, each of these five papers offer important contributions on topics of 
contemporary interest in legal philosophy as well as in the theory of international and 
transnational law. Taken together, however, the represent a more significant attempt to 
engage mutual learning between these fields. They demonstrate how by focusing on the 
specificities of international and transnational legal orders it is possible to rethink and 
potentially enhance the explanatory capability of legal theory. Moreover, the papers show 
how methodological debates in jurisprudence can help contribute to a better 
understanding of what it is to ‘do’ international and transnational legal research.  
 
